OSTMODERNITY is a word one finds now with some frequency in both scholarly and casual literature. It is a "movement" that has inspired raging debates about the "cult of theory" across the arts and sciences. My intention in this article is to examine several central themes of postmodernity and the manner in which they affect critical theological issues. I contend that individuals grappling with many of the major disputed questions in theology today-truth, hermeneutics, language, and correlation-have much to learn from postmodern theory, but must do so without abandoning the legitimate achievements of previous epochs.
former goal: determining the deepest structures of reality and the transcendental conditions allowing for knowledge of them. The radical temporality saturating every aspect of being and thought has forced the ancient discipline to rethink its object and task.
Given this fresh understanding, it is logical that postmodern thinkers subject to particular invective ontological mainstays such as a common human nature or a universal notion of rationality. Such ideas seek to establish and embed a solid rock, an immovable object within the river of historicity. Richard Campbell, for example, is representative of current trends when he says, "In assuming the timelessness of truth, the traditional view assumed a human capacity to know that truth and thus a human nature that, if only in virtue ofthat decisive capacity, is unchanging."
8 Rather than speak of a stable and universal human nature, postmodern thinkers are much more likely to refer to a culturally constituted human rationality emerging from the tight web of history, society, and language. Precisely as posi modernity, this represents a new moment in the history of philosophy. 9 Louis Dupré makes much of the rise of medieval nominalism in the passage to modernity. For the ancient realists, nature was communicative of reality; truth was mediated by the cosmos. Dupré argues that the ancients were constructivists only to the extent that culture represented a further molding of a given nature. For the nominalists, on the contrary, form belongs not to nature but to the mind. With Descartes and Kant, the form-giving principle of the subject is intensified. There is a gradual loss of cosmic intelligibility, of the truth mediated by physis and nomos, of the link between God and creatures. For post-Kantian voluntarism, nature is an enemy of freedom precisely because it tries to mold the subject a priori. But only the idealizing synthesis of the person is truly mediative of meaning (Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture [New Haven: Yale University, 19931). Both the classical tradition and modernity, in different ways, sought to preserve the notion of form, one by means of nature, the other by synthetic interiority. Postmodernity, in its "strong" form, seeks to overcome any ontology of either cosmos or subjectivity. Moderate postmodernity does not reject all form, only the classical foundationalist form of nature and the foundationalist subject of modern transcendental thought. Gadamer and Habermas, e.g., defend form, but now in a highly protean manner-in the case of Gadamer, tradition and history; for Habermas, the discourse community.
ture-grace or creation-salvation distinction. For Catholics, the two or ders, ontological and soteriological, are distinct (at least notionally) but in fundamental continuity. For traditional Protestantism, on the other hand, a wedge has been driven between fallen and corrupted nature and the work of the Redeemer. Protestantism finds the call of postmodernity for a meta-onto-theology legitimate and useful precisely be cause Protestant theology has resisted the notion of the Form of the Cosmos and of the logos structure of reality intelligible in itself, even apart (again, notionally) from Jesus Christ and the gospel of grace. Protestant thinkers connaturally find in postmodernit/s deconstruction of ontology a convergence with its own suspicion of the inner intelligibility of nature and being.
Of course, the roots of the Protestant protest against theological ontology go back to the Pauline imagination undergirding the Refor mation. The logos structure of reality that Catholicism adopted from the ancient world, further fueled by the rebirth of pagan learning be gun by the late medieval Italians, gave rise to the suspicion that the glory of the world was now confused with the glory of God. The Refor mation protest was precisely against a semi-Pelagian analogizing imagination that tended to overlook God's judgment on the world ren dered dramatically in the cross of Christ. This movement challenged a too-easy medieval and Renaissance elision of the majesty of nature with the grandeur of the Revealed God. 10 The evangelical objection was aimed at every attempt to collapse the unique and undeducible Form of the Crucified God into the form of inner-worldly or subjective beauty. Even apart from the influence of postmodernity, then, classical Protestantism has strong lethic and decentering currents born of its understanding of the gospel.
One indication of the theoretical confluence between Protestantism and elements of postmodern philosophy may be seen in the exchange between Gadamer and Leo Strauss on the publication οι Wahrheit und Methode. In one part of the dialogue, Strauss protests against Gadamer's hermeneutical theory, especially its overthrow of the stability of textual meaning. Gadamer responds, "What I believe to have under stood through Heidegger (and what I can testify to from my Protestant background) is, above all, that philosophy must learn to do without the idea of an infinite intellect. I have attempted to draw up a correspond ing hermeneutics.
,,11 For Gadamer, both hermeneutical phenomenol ogy and the Reformation teach humanity about finitude. And finitude 10 Hans Urs von Balthasar has pointed out that the iconoclasm of Luther remains important because it "keeps the transcendental beauty of revelation from slipping back into equality with an inner-worldly natural beauty" {The Glory of the is what Protestantism, by its early deconstruction of theological ontology, by its exaltation of the theology of the Cross, by its intense apophaticism, and by its emphasis on eschatological rather than present realization, clearly understands. Fixed meanings and dogmas are illsuited to handle human historicity and human limitations.
Under the penetrating influence of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer, Catholic thinkers, too, have moved in the direction of deconstructing theological ontology. Jean-Luc Marion, for example, has argued that only the dismantling of traditional thought will allow an apposite notion of the Christian God to emerge, for the idolic imagination to be replaced by the truly iconic vision. Marion's project is to establish the limits of the being question, discarding, in the process, the classical and transcendental metaphysical baggage that has led to a distorted image of divine life. 12 Framing his arguments somewhat differently, David Tracy represents another type of Catholic postmodernity; he, too, argues that in light of our newly-presenced situation, theology must honestly evaluate its classical self-understanding, particularly its notion of ontology. 13 The traditional assessment, notably with regard to doctrine, seeks to freeze the flux, to deaden historical consciousness, to finish the conversation. By so doing, theology leaves itself open to Habermas's charge that it must be sealed off from the ideal-speech situation and from the communicative praxis of egalitarian society. Theology is already committed a priori; it is not fully "open" to effective history nor to the serious rethinking demanded by radical temporality.
Perduring questions remain in the wake of postmodern thought. Are the traditional approaches now simply wrong, that is, ontologically inappropriate given our newly presenced cultural and linguistic horizons? Does foundationalist ontology paper over the ruptures and breaches within life and thought? Does it ignore the Cross? If so, what meta-onto-theological discourse should we create as a replacement? Some Catholic thinkers have turned to mysticism and doxology. This is the move made by Marion, curiously approximating the nonreligious esthetic and poetic mysticism of Adorno and Heidegger.
14 But does this solve the persistent systematic issues? More specifically, when one turns toward postmodernity (even in its moderate genre) how is the continuity and identity of the deposit of faith established? And how is the truth status of doctrine to be understood? Obviously, a move towards nonfoundationalist ontology means either a turn toward significant mutability and flexibility in fundamental Christian teachings or, conversely, a fideistic assertion of the immutable truth of the gospel, prescinding from any attempt to establish this immutability reasonably. Without a foundationalist ontology of some sort, there is no possibility for logically sustaining the stability of textual meaning or a referential notion of truth, which appear to be essential principles for traditional understandings of doctrine.
Of course, several postmodern concerns have already been addressed by Catholic theology. Bernard Lonergan, for example, has been one of the most balanced thinkers on this issue, again and again seeking to show the extent to which historical consciousness and its attendant horizons have affected traditional understanding. Lonergan argues that classical culture was right in assuming there was a universal human nature, but that it misunderstood the extent to which this essential nature was open. In conjunction with this premise, Lonergan developed a transcendental philosophy outlining the invariant structures of human consciousness while concomitantly championing changing worlds of meaning and tirelessly defending, against neoScholasticism, the mutability of conceptual constructs. Karl Rahner, too, even while defending his transcendental gnoseology, ceaselessly sought to show the extent to which historical and hermeneutical consciousness had a deep and lasting effect on meaning and interpretation. As his thought progressed, Rahner argued with increasing vigor for the influence of postmodern horizons on the formulations of doctrine, without ever abandoning the theological ontology of his critical starting point. 16 A recent phenomenological defense of foundationalism is offered by Robert Sokolowski, who justifies both the possibility of knowing "essentials" and the constructive dimension of noetic acts intrinsically connected with historicity. Seeking to illumine the complementarity rather than opposition between nature and culture, he writes, "We never have sheer nature without convention, or sheer convention without nature; the two are always tangled. Nature is displayed to us only as refracted through custom and custom always mixes with the natural. At the beginning of the De consolatione philosophiae, Lady Philosophy visits the imprisoned Boethius to comfort him. Inscribed on the lower part of her robe is the Greek letter pi, standing for practical philosophy, while on the upper section is embroidered the letter theta for theoretical philosophy. One suspects that in any postmodern version of the De consolatione, however, Lady Philosophy would be forced to undergo a serious fashion makeover. This is so because postmodernity holds that the deconstruction of classical and modern ontologies, of substance and transcendental subject, means likewise the logical deconstruction of classical and modern notions of truth. The failure of traditional foundational systems to recognize the sociocultural embeddedness of rationality and the historical facticity of discourse has led, inevitably, to atomistic and ontologically inappropriate ideas about what truth is. 20 The depth of the postmodern critique has occasioned one commentator to claim that the current battle against the Enlightenment is, at base, a rebellion against truth.
21 But surely this is only partially true. It is a rebellion against truth as traditionally understood; in this sense, it does amount to an abandonment of the theoretical notion of truth which was formerly philosophy's domain. But this abandonment is done consciously and in the interest of adjusting to further knowledge about our historical limitations. Under the forceful influence of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, postmodernity argues that truth is entirely mediated by historical flux, societal norms, and cultural warrants. To speak of truth as a grasping of actual states of affairs is naïve precisely because it fails to take account of an evermutable humanity and society. To the extent that the solid earth of human nature (with its ontological constancy) has been abandoned, to this same measure must our notion of truth be adjusted. An appropriate understanding of ontology has, necessarily, veridical effects. In Campbell's words, "If man's very humanity differs from age to age, from culture to culture ... [then] our own being varies relative to differing historical situations; in turn, that seems to imply that what is appropriated, the truths we claim to grasp, are likewise relative."
22
While the end of foundationalism should not be confused with the end of philosophy, it should awaken us to the fact that claims to truth are largely, if not exclusively, culturally constituted frameworks. But if it is true that knowledge arises only within a web of contingent, finite, sociocultural situations (and not only arises within but is likewise totally delimited by them), then the present and continuing philosophical task is to develop new understandings of truth and rationality consonant with our rethinking of ontology. In accord with this goal, several notions of truth have been advanced as appropriate to our postmetaphysical, posttranscendental, postpositivist world. The ideas common to many contemporary philosophers and theologians include variations on the ethical pragmatism of James, Dewey, and Pierce, the rehabilitation of Aristotle's phronesis, or "practical reason," by Gadamer, and the neopragmatic communicative discourse theory of Habermas. Each of these is congruent with our more recent understanding.
23
Practical reason, for example, as classically understood, is that dimension of reason that deals with mutable, changing circumstances; it was normally opposed to epistemic or theoretical reason which grasped unchanging truth or essentials. 24 Yves Simon is representative of the traditional distinction when he argues that practical reason is proper to contingent circumstances and does not have the universality proper to essences. Along the same lines, C. D. C. Reeve notes that "phronesis is more concerned with particulars than with universale" for "phronesis studies endechomena, things that admit of being otherwise." 25 Postmodern thinkers argue that practical reason is the proper mode of all truth precisely because of finitude and historicity; these horizons have taught us that truth is necessarily contingent, is always reversible, is capable of being otherwise. Habermas, however, is fearful that society cannot properly function within the poetic mysticism of Heidegger's understanding of human existence. If we are to avoid the aporias of esoterism and privatism, we must have the means to adjudicate claims to truth within contemporary society, the polis. It is one thing to stipulate that radical historicity and the assimilation of rationality to conventionally accepted language games demonstrates the inappropriateness of metaphysics. It is quite another task, however, to provide democratic societies with political and philosophical guidance on the proper functioning of the marketplace of human ideas, the agora, in postfoundational society. Against those championing completely incompatible standards and languages, Habermas defends the importance of the public redemption of warrants for the substantiation and validation of truth claims. Without such publicly redeemable warrants, even if these are deeply embedded within the community, society cannot function. There is, then, no denial of rationality, but a recognition that communicative reason is "a rocking hull-but it does not go under in the sea of contingencies, even if shuddering in the high seas is the only mode in which it 'copes' with these contingencies." 2 What type of truth is characteristic of the "rocking hull" of communicative rationality? It is, of course, the truth of practical reason, now strengthened and fortified by means of a universal neopragmatics. Truth is reached by the community of inquirers through free, rational, and undistorted appeal, not by coercion or through the stipulation of first principles. It is true that reason is thoroughly historical and functions within highly delimited circumstances; nonetheless, historical, situated reason must redeem its assertions by public warrants. Only public redemption adequately allows the distinction between war-ranted claims and acts of ideological consciousness. This view does not provide us with the inappropriate security of transcendental metaphysics and of referentialism, but neither does it lapse into anarchism or gnosticism. The pragmatic understanding of truth, subtly structured as communicative praxis, has the further advantage of fundamental congruency with the aims of egalitarian Uberai democracies increasingly heterogeneous in population, views, customs, and mores. Defenders of neopragmatism appear to foster the creation of multivalent cultures of tolerance, while those expressing doubt about practical forms of truth seem to be a priori opposed to the inclusive ideals of liberal democracy itself.
What are the theological implications of this move towards pragmatic and praxis-oriented models of truth? Why have many theologians found them useful?
28 One reason for the attraction to Habermas's discourse theory is that it may be marshalled to heal the split between the public and private domains. Religion, it is argued, should not be excluded from the marketplace, the sphere of public interchange. Ghettoizing religion serves neither believers nor the societies in which they are citizens. How can religion remain part of the public conversation without demanding that it alone is true and all other "secular" philosophies must yield before it?
29 Can Habermas's communicative praxis give theology a significant role in wider society? Can it help provide a public validation of theology's claims? At first glance, Habermas seems an unlikely ally. Truth, in the ideal-speech situation, amounts to those validity claims that can be cognitively redeemed by public warrants. And there's the rub. To what extent can religion provide public warrants for its claims? Habermas says it cannot do so at all, ironically arguing that it might harm its very essence if it sought this goal. 30 The unavoidable consequence, however, is that religion 29 This issue concerns both David Tracy and Richard John Neuhaus. Each seeks to mend the rift between "secular" and "sacred" realms. Tracy does it by adopting phronesis and mutually critical correlation. Only such mutuality (and the abandonment of a priori truth claims) allows religion to be taken seriously by the democratic publics of the academy and society. Neuhaus, on the contrary, thinks that religious citizens of the American republic must insist on a public voice and are under no necessity to relinquish their unique truth claims. Such relinquishment would continue the relegation of religion outside of the "public square" begun in the Enlightenment. Both Tracy and Neuhaus are close to the classical Catholic position of validating at least some of Christianity's truth claims on the basis of public warrants. For Neuhaus, this involves a turn to the natural law tradition; for Tracy, a turn to discourse theory.
30 "In the Federal Republic of Germany ... it was primarily a group of Catholic theologians who, having always maintained a less troubled relation to the lumen naturale, were able to draw upon this tradition [of conversation with the discourses of the humanities and social sciences]. Yet, the more that theology opens itself in general to the must be excluded from communal discourse. Religion, with its a priori teleological view, cannot be allowed as a player in this discussion because (from the start and according to its very essence) it violates the rules of the game by limiting communicative freedom. This is why, for Habermas, the authority of consensus ethics must now replace the authority of the sacred: 'The legitimizing function of religious views of the world is replaced by rationally motivated agreement."
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Despite this Habermasian refusal, some theologians seek to show that theology can become a viable player in the larger community of discourse according to neopragmatic rules. David Tracy and Helmut Peukert, for example, argue that the critical transformation of society may serve as a public warrant and criterion, validating and redeeming, to some extent, the truth claims of Christianity. Habermas's theological conversation partners "argue that theology as a critical practical and public theology is self-confidently theology when it is not authoritarian ... when it is not sectarian but engaged in discursive deliberation about its ethical content and when it advocates a method of critical correlation. itself from democratic, public discourse when it insists on certain first principles that are posited rather than effectively argued for.
On the other hand, it is clear that the turn toward pragmatic notions of truth creates certain tensions. The tradition, as emphasized by Boethius's Consolation, distinguished practical from theoretical truth. As Aquinas was to say seven centuries later, Truth in the practical intellect is not the same as truth in the speculative intellect as is said in Ethics VI (1139A 26). For the true in the speculative intellect arises from the conformity of the intellect with the thing.... The true in the practical intellect arises from conformity with rectified appetite, a conformity which has no place in necessary things which do not come about because of the human will, but only in contingent things.... Therefore, only a virtue of practical intellect is concerned with contingent things.
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Of course, postmodern thinkers will logically argue that Aquinas, like Aristotle on whom he is commenting, is working with an inappropriate understanding of ontology, one virtually ignorant of the radical contingencies of historicity, leading inexorably to an inappropriate understanding of truth. For theology, however, the crucial issues remain: realist thinkers, that the subject is an essential player in noetic acts and necessarily affects the known by virtue of an entire preunderstanding, a welter of suppositions, background beliefs, and ideological commitments. The subject is anything but a tabula rasa who, in Lonergan's terms, naively "takes a look" at the world. Rather, "natural wholes [essentials] are displayed to us in the thick of human custom, making and culture." 36 But this is simply to note that the world as known is always already mediated by the knower.
This echoes what Chenu, Bouillard, de Lubac, and others argued at the time of the nouvelle théologie, that the truth of revelation inexorably follows the law of the Incarnation. God's truth comes to us in the midst of and embedded within sociological, anthropological, and cultural horizons; all truth, human and divine, is mediated by historical norms. Still, the fundamental question persists: Amid this web of beliefs and network of contingencies, are essences still displayed to us? The answer to this question separates the two notions of truth under discussion. For one, historicity is so determinative of both knower and known that knowledge is fundamentally, if not entirely, a human construct. The agent is the grasper, molder, shaper, former, and creator. For the other, a constructive dimension of knowing is acknowledged (and not simply admitted but welcomed as ontologically productive), but it is further claimed that the human noetic faculty is connaturally proportioned to the logos structure of the world. Inasmuch as the intellect is capax mundi, it can and does represent existing states of affairs accurately.
The theological concern raised by theories of communicative praxis is that revelation is now seemingly discovered by the consensual community of discourse, attenuating at least to some extent the idea that revelation is primarily the Word of God, the gift of God to the Church. More seriously, emphasis is no longer placed on the substantial continuity of God's revelatory Word because such material continuity can only be logically sustained by a referential notion of perduring truth.
37
Of course, in theories resting on practical rationality a new understanding of revelation emerges, one that is deeply informed by contingency and historicity. Jack Bonsor offers a good example of this understanding of revelation and of the truth proper to it. 36 Revelation is now highly epiphanic, strongly influenced by Heidegger's dialectic of absence and presence, veiling and unveiling (the etymological meaning of "apocalypse"). The revealed truth emerging is not enduringly descriptive and representational; it is not meant to provide an ontologically truncated immutable Word. One may say that revelation offers insight, but it is insight that always appears in a moment of the historical flux; it cannot be captured or stake a permanent claim to normativity. There is a sense here in which revelation perdures, but the perdurance is of a unique type, formal rather than material in kind. Humanity continues to receive flashes of unveiledness, glimmers of presence. One would be entirely mistaken, however, to insist on historical identity or to reject conflicting claims or descriptions as illogical. Such an approach, once again, is trapped in ontotheology and its parallel misunderstandings. 39 For postmodern theologians, Christians possess texts and symbols that continue to make claims on them and on which they continue to reflect. Different truths and different understandings reveal themselves successively. It is essential to note that one is decidedly not speaking of complementary perspectives, or of simple changes in angle, but of possibly conflicting statements that appear over the course of time.
In this understanding of revelation and the truth proper to it, one clearly sees the influence of Heidegger, with his notion of the "givenness" of Being and the "event" from which it emerges. In the continuing dialectic of presence and absence, of disclosure and hiddenness, the truth of Being is variously given in different epochs. This is precisely what it means to take temporality seriously. The process of giving and withdrawing, mediated by history, does not allow for the kind of material continuity that has been traditionally associated with doctrine. Such continuity relies on discredited notions of both being and truth, with their forgetfulness of historicity and its deeply lethic dimensions. Postmodern theologians argue that an appropriate ontology now demands an apposite theology of revelation. It demands as well a proper understanding of interpretative theory.
HERMENEUTICS
If postmodernity affects one's understanding of truth, then it also affects, necessarily and forcefully, one's understanding of textual interpretation. For any hermeneutical theory is a logical corollary of one's (non)foundationalist option. The crux of the matter involves determining interpretative appropriateness in light of our contemporary situation.
The neuralgic issue in the current debate is the status of reconstructive hermeneutical theories. The hallmark of such theories is the claim that texts have a stable and determinate meaning that may be recovered and re-presented by an interpreter (even centuries or millennia 39 One sees here the convergence between the epiphanic understanding of truth and the assertion that the truth proper to art is paradigmatic for the truth status of religious claims. later) after proper philological and sociocultural analysis. Traditionally, this understanding was based, even if not always explicitly, on the fundamental unity of human nature perduring across history. A shared ontology or common nature, however understood, grounded a recoverable and representable textual meaning. If, however, as postmodernity claims, there is no fundamental human nature, shared essence, transcendental consciousness, or invariant structure of knowing, then one cannot speak of a common matrix for reconstructive thought. Without some universal nature "rooting" objectivist hermeneutics, one cannot logically defend a stable and recoverable textual content.
Reconstructive understanding is the basis of the form/content or context/content distinction so popular in theology and in other disciplines. This approach holds that one may distinguish the meaning or content of a text from its particular context or form. It is to recognize that authors may say the same things (with nuances, of course) within a variety of expressions, systems, and schémas. It is not to claim that language is simply a shell; it is to recognize a distinction between meaning and expression. 40 The form/content distinction rests on the ability of the interpreter to understand an "alien" text, to reproduce its meaning (with the help of proper tools), and then to recast the meaning in another form or context. A determinate meaning will be preserved, even if this meaning is reexpressed in another notional system. Theologically, the context/meaning distinction has its roots in Garden, Bouillard, Congar, Chenu, de Lubac, and Balthasar. It was particularly helpful in trying to free theology from the univocal method imposed by Aeterni Patris. By emphasizing a stability of content within a variety of conceptual forms, theologians could legitimately argue for the material transmission of the selfsame deposit of faith while simultaneously pressing the case for a new dialogue with phenomenology, Marxism, and transcendental thought. A stable and perduring doctrinal meaning was combined with some degree of fluidity and flexibility in formulation and expression. Ultimately, this viewpoint was officially sanctioned by Vatican II and by subsequent magisterial documents. It has been equally endorsed by Lonergan, Rahner, Kasper, and Dulles. notion of truth, is inexorably linked to a discredited and truncated ontology. 42 Heidegger has deconstructed any notion of perduring nature or transcendental structure by unveiling the epistemologically buried horizon of historicity enveloping all being and thought. He has revealed the depths to which Dasein is always already constituted and constructed by preunderstanding, linguisticality, thrownness, and finitude. Gadamer has extended the Heideggerian project to interpretative theory, showing how the previously forgotten "worldhood of the world" and the fundamental matrix of temporality are now essentially constitutive of all textual readings. One can no longer speak of reconstructive understanding. A different kind of continuity than the type established by "Romantic" hermeneutics must now be found.
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Building on Heidegger's insights, Gadamer rejects both the form/ content and understanding/application distinctions of traditional hermeneutical theory. Both distinctions assume the possibility of reconstructive interpretation, a strategy necessarily rooted in some type of foundationalist ontology. But such an interpretative theory fails woefully to understand the deep lethic consequences of historicity. This is one reason why 'tradition" is so central to Gadamer's thought. Having rejected foundationalist ontology, he must now uncover some other form of continuity that successfully avoids random pluralism and hermeneutical anarchy. He turns to the Hegelian ontologization of history and the "fusion of horizons" as ways of rescuing historical identity. The unity now established is quite different from any classical and inappropriate notion of material identity; it is rather a formal, historical continuity which allows Gadamer simultaneously to defend the importance of tradition and a wide plurality of textual readings. logical circles has been so thorough and convincing that today hermeneutics is frequently spoken of as a replacement for metaphysics and epistemology. What is attractive about Gadamer's hermeneutical theory? In the first place, he properly centralizes Heidegger's attempt to exhume the Lebenswelt from the obsequies pronounced by neoKantian transcendental philosophy. No naïve positivism, bloodless transcendentalism, or abstract conceptualism could obstruct Heidegger's retrieval of the starkly tenebrous dimensions of historicity. Gadamer brought the full weight of Heidegger's ideas to interpretative theory, properly employing them to unmask hermeneutical positivism with its exaltation of subjective self-annihilation. Second, Gadamer exposed in a new way the impossibility of reconstructing and interpreting texts apart from the mediation of personal subjectivity. The interpreting agent emerges from the nexus of history and language with a contextual rationality, an embedded subjectivity, and an ideologically saturated perspective. Interpretation, then, is never simply repetition; it is always and everywhere production and creation. Third, Gadamer maintains the axial nature of tradition, but the kind of tradition affirmed supersedes a stolid traditionalism that forestalls growth, change, and development.
To classical theological thought, postmodern hermeneutics presents a persistent and troubling challenge. Once the deconstruction of foundationalist ontology is accepted as demonstrated, certain conclusions inevitably follow. One such conclusion is the denial of the intelligibility of the form/content distinction, the interpretative path undergirding the magisterium's view of theological pluralism, inculturation, and bilateral ecumenical agreements. In all cases, it is claimed, there is an identity of content that may be reconstructed, transmitted from age to age, and then recontextualized and reexpressed in a way that, while certainly allowing for new insights, formulas, and perspectives, also preserves the essential content of the original meaning. terns, like instrumental rationality, serve to level the heteronomous Other. Countering this tendency, Derrida speaks of the "play of the signifiers" that simultaneously "refer and defer." The world cannot be captured; it defies homogenization by the flattening conceptualism of representational language.
52
In some ways, all of Derrida's work should be seen as a rhetorical trick with a deadly serious philosophical point. He champions the deconstruction of classical semiotics because linguistic entropy is necessary to allow an ontologically appropriate understanding of language to appear. The world's otherness and différe(a)nce will only emerge when we acknowledge the limits of representational thought. Conceptualization is "the first falsehood" for Derrida precisely because it seeks to marginalize the Other; it falsifies and excludes the particular, the different, the "accidental." Postmodernity, on the other hand, searches for rupture and breach; it shows that our semiotic systems fail to see the polyvalence of the world beyond the logocentrism of the text. In place of representation, the playftd character of language is lionized. Difference, rather than unity, is raised to the prime hermeneutical principle.
Derrida's understanding of language has a determinate logic. If the representational force of linguistic and semiotic systems can be deconstructed, then the logos structure of reality, and ultimately the one who undergirds this cosmos, the Transcendental Signified, may be deconstructed as well. For Derrida, God has become the ultimate totalizing agent, the Signified who unites the metaphysical idea of cosmic intelligibility with the ostensive view of language. It is the Transcendental Signified, especially as exemplified by the Logos, that weds Western representational thought to signifiers. The Logos becomes the signifier of the Absent (now) Present because in the Incarnate Logos we have the presenced absence of God himself. In Christ, the signified is perfectly expressed in the signifier, divinely undergirding of course the idea of semiotic representation.
53 Derrida can only overcome this tradition by denying that the sign is a signifier for the absent present. Linguistic deconstruction will release texts from any vestige of logocentric reproduction and authorial control. The metaphysical link between the intelligible and the sensible (the signified of the absent now present) will be severed. This will free language from its metaphysical appear. The thought of Being cannot properly mediate the heteronomy of Gxd. It keeps him tethered to the conceptual idolatry of the ontotheo-logical tradition that seeks to take God in its grasp, defining and measuring him. The classical tradition has unwittingly made God the "divine prisoner of Being." But Gxd is the Giver beyond the ontological difference. He gives the Being/beings distinction, but he himself cannot be dominated by Being or placed within its framework. 56 It is no surprise, then, that Marion expresses Derrida-like reservations about signifiers, especially when applied to God. Not wanting to follow Derrida entirely, however, Marion turns to Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhard, and the mystical tradition in order to explain the type of intelligibility proper to theology. The inadequacy of the language of Being forces a cathartic turn to the more poetic forms of agapic love. Such a shift successfully subverts the enclosing dimensions of ontology. Rather than freezing the idolic gaze, the agapic turn yields to an iconic attitude, recognizing the Gxd who is both ungraspable and unknowable.
What Marion ultimately offers is a kind of deconstruction of attempts to name God, a project undertaken precisely in service to God's Otherness. We move very close to the heart of his central theological concern when he says that true theology "will submit all of its concepts ... to a 'destruction' by the doctrine of divine names, at the risk of having to renounce any status as a conceptual 'science,' in order, decidedly nonobjectivating, to praise by infinite petitions." 57 Marion logically roots theology in mysticism rather than in any kind of conceptual logic. Such a move is necessary inasmuch as theology has "nothing like an object, theology having none of the characteristics of scientificity, and especially not its objectivity." 58 Ibid. 163. Marion is here emphasizing the gift-like nature of revelation, its otherness, the fact that humanity does not control and measure it. This he clearly opposes to a kind of "anthropological" theology dominant since Schleiermacher. Such emphasis explains why David Tracy, in his laudatory "Forward" to God without Being, says that Marion is more clearly a Co/nmurao-oriented Catholic rather than a Concilium-oriented one (xv). To a certain extent this is true; however, it should be remembered that Balthasar (the paradigmatic Communio Catholic) criticized Barth for failing to see that Catholicism's interest in philosophy, especially the analogy of being, was for the sake of maintaining the rational infrastructure of revelation. Consequently Balthasar, despite From one point of view, Marion's rich work reminds us, unceasingly, of God's alterity. He consistently "presences" the "hidden God," the God beyond all representations. He deconstructs the provincial God captured by determinate logic. The Derrida-inspired neologism "Gxd" is meant to alert us precisely to the irreducible divine heteronomy beyond human control. Marion rightly states that "Revelation ... can neither be confused with nor subjected to the philosophical thought of 'God' as being." 59 His project, of course, is to defend and advance the deep apophaticism of the tradition; the "divine mysteries" cannot be captured and encompassed by any conceptual system. With Heidegger, then, Marion condemns any attitude of theological "objectification" as particularly inappropriate when speaking of the "hidden things of God." Such condemnation is ironically lurking behind Marion's positive comments on transubstantiation, which, for all of its Aristotelian apparatus, nonetheless properly protects the "otherness" of God's presence in the eucharistie elements. Divine alterity is far better guarded by the medieval synthesis than, for example, by the Hegelian understanding of God residing in the consciousness of the community. One approach allows the full heteronomy of God, the Giver of the Gift to appear; the other quickly descends to an idolic anthropocentrism. Only the medieval achievement allows the "shock" of revelation to appear in all its uniqueness. Fathers, perhaps paradigmatically represented by the Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen, who seeks to undermine the semirationalism of the Eunomians while still maintaining a positive cognitive content to revelation. Or recall the guarded reserve of St. Thomas who opens the Summa by questioning his entire project with a citation from Ecclesiasticus 3:22: Altiora te ne quaesieris. 61 Further, the tradition vigorously affirmed, in a way overlooked by God without Being, the claim that God is beyond common being. Several commentators on Marion's book were rankled by his misplaced charges regarding the "conceptualism" of the tradition, pointing out that Aquinas claimed that no created form can represent the divine essence for God cannot be circumscribed by a determinate perfection (ST 1, q. 12, art. 2) .
62 Of course, a major task of Thomistic studies in this century has been to recover the grand apophatic strategies of Aquinas: the res /modus distinction; the per prius predication of perfections to the Godhead; and the polemic against the plura ad unum type of analogy. All serve to avoid the subordination of the divine essence to the transcendentals. naively referential semiotic systems. Willingly it speaks of the "deferring" character of theological signs and the "undecideability" of language. At the same time, only a qualified appropriation of postmodern thought on the nature and function of signifiers seems called for. Marion minimizes the extent to which the tradition has already understood and defended the surplus of intelligibility proper to the Godhead, while still preserving a positive moment within revelation. Must language be completely nonobjectifying to protect God's otherness? To claim that predication must yield to praise appears to limit theological language to its doxological and anagogical dimensions, thereby enervating its cognitive spine. Of course, if one's understanding of revelation is epiphanic, then the status of theological language will be largely symbolic, in the sense of allegorical and suggestive rather than analogical, in the sense of predicable and referential. Such an approach allows a much wider berth for constructive theology than has been the case classically, but it moves in a very different direction than the tradition on the issue of the intelligible yield of theological statements.
CORRELATION
Unlike the four subjects discussed above, postmodern thought has no independent position on the question of correlation. Yet correlation is a good illustration of how postmodern themes affect an important dimension of fundamental theology. 67 I take as prime analogues two schools prominent in contemporary American thought, postliberalism and revisionism, or as they are sometimes called, Yale and Chicago. I argue that, although these schools have been widely perceived as opposed or as taking very different approaches to theology, they are in fact much closer than is usually supposed. The reason for this is that both positions rely heavily on nonfoundationalist themes. The differences between them result from the type of nonfoundationalism each espouses. 68 I will briefly outline these two styles, then offer what I consider a possible third form of correlation.
The term "postliberalism" has been widely associated with the work of George Lindbeck, Ronald Thiemann, and various other representa- 67 For an excellent summary of correlational theologies, see Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, "Systematic Theology: Task and Methods," in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives 1, ed. F. S. Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991) 55-61. Once again, it will be clear that I am using postmodernity in its "moderate" rather than its "strong" sense. 68 In his fine article "The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck?" Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61 (1993) 655-77, Richard Lints says that both authors reject Enlightenment modernity. This is true. However, it should be added that, for different reasons, both reject any foundationalism whatsoever, epistemological or ontological, of classical, medieval, or modern thought. Lindbeck's rejection is based on a concern that Christianity is now judged by external warrants. Tracy rejects foundationalism because he connects it with a metaphysical and transcendental desire to avoid the impact of historicity. tives of the Yale School. Strongly influenced by nonfoundationalist thinkers such as Quine, Seilars, Geertz, and Wittgenstein, postliberals accept the position that each of us is initiated into a unique form of life and world of discourse. We are largely, perhaps entirely, determined by particular cultural-linguistic societies. Criteria, warrants, and standards used to judge one community are inapplicable to another. This is precisely the reason we have moved past rationalist modernity to postliberal postmodernity. The result of this kind of nonfoundationalism, with its accent on the regional determination of thought, is the rejection of universale of any kind. The overarching circumscription by socio-cultural-linguistic worlds demands that postliberalism reject the claims of transcendental thinkers (even if they are truly historicized metaphysicians) like Lonergan and Rahner, as well as those advanced by Schleiermacher and all í< experiential-expressive ,, reactions to neoKantianism. These different brands of universalism are both philosophically and theologically inappropriate.
69
Postliberals resist foundationalist, universalizing thought because they see it as a secular Archimedean lever, a purely philosophical warrant by which some thinkers, entirely unconnected with the house of faith, seek to judge Christian belief. The gospel now becomes secondary to some prior unity, some foundation, some epistemological or ontological standard to which the Christian message must submit its truth claims. But cultural-linguistic systems are incommunicable; modes of verification are proper and unique to specific forms of life. Therefore Christianity is under no obligation to offer public warrants for its claims or to defer to any kind of extrabiblical adjudication.
Questions have quickly arisen: Does this avoidance of public standards of truth and rationality limit theology merely to intrasystemic coherence? Does "intratextual consistency" smack of a fideistic assertion of the truth of Christianity over and against other forms of life and discourse? 70 72 Like Yale, Chicago accepts the nonfoundationalist ontology outlined above, especially the priority of the historical flux and the illusion of searching out immutable first principles or Archimedean points whether metaphysical, transcendental, phenomenological, or empirical. In this respect revisionist theology is comparable to its postliberal counterpart. The distinction between the two schools is to be found in the fact that revisionist theology thinks all validity claims, including theological ones, must have public attestation; in Habermasian terms, truth claims must be redeemed by publicly available warrants rather than by authoritarian assertion. Such an approach is fueled by the revisionist desire to justify theology in the educational marketplace, to establish the discipline as a legitimate academic and therefore public enterprise. But what must be clearly understood is that this public redemption of truth claims must be nonfoundationalist in kind. It is not a matter of seeking unshakeable foundations or principles, but of pursuing, even if asymptotically, the consensual norms yielded by the ideal-speech situation. In this type of nonfoundationalism, the shuddering contingencies of Habermas's "rocking hull" are not abandoned.
Revisionism further speaks of intertextuality, of a "mutually critical correlation" between Christian theology and other disciplines. Here Tracy and others introduce into the ancient notion of interpenetrative mutuality a deep apophatic sense. One cannot now take the truth claims of Christianity to be normative a priori as understood by the traditional 'faith seeking understanding." If all narratives must be justified by publicly available warrants, then one must argue in the marketplace for the warranted assertability of the Christian faith. Theological truth claims can only be defended through the consensus arising from the community of inquirers on the basis of publicly adduced and adequately redeemed warrants. Any other approach is simply regarded as untenable special pleading.
One may see here, as with Habermas himself, a true universalism, but a universalism of a very specific type. There is no defense of classical or Enlightenment standards of rationality. Revisionists recognize that all of us are gathered in the rocking hull of contingencies and no one, not even those on the ship of faith, has a secure and privileged position amid the tides of history. Against the accusation that it has abandoned the clarion purity of the gospel for the golden calf of dialogue and mutuality, Chicago counters that the mere assertion of Christianity's truth ghettoizes the faith, excluding it from the larger world of scholarly and humane discourse. In some ways, of course, the revisionist school is clearly echoing classical Catholic themes. Its concern with "publicness," for example, with the idea that some evidence for faith is available to all reasonable inquirers, strikes a deeply reso- tives and a publicly warranted redemption of all truth claims. This approach violates the primacy of the faith and the uniqueness of the knowledge yielded by it.
In this third understanding of correlation, theology is not captive to Enlightenment modernity, either in its foundationalist form or in its contemporary metamorphosis as communicative rationality; nor is it bound to assert fideistically Christianity's truth claims without the benefit of philosophical supports. 75 With Yale, the normativity of the gospel is proclaimed. However, it is hardly essential that correlation be repudiated to achieve this, or that the primacy of the gospel demand concomitantly a strident either/or. On the contrary, theology and the Church choose and absorb as they wish. In the words of de Lubac, "In the Church, the work of assimilation never ceases and it is never too soon to undertake it!" 76 With revisionism, then, the importance of correlation is championed. However, there is an option in the act of faith such that sheer interpenetrative mutuality between theology and the disciplines is excluded. Historically conscious foundationalism, while always seeking truth from new sources, recognizes the ascendancy of the revelatory narrative. And if revelation requires some form of ontological foundationalism for the sake of protecting the continuity and material identity of the gospel message, this too must be reasonably if revelation is understood in the classical sense of a locutio Dei that is, in some substantive manner, continuous, identical, perpetual, universal, and self-same. Traditionally, there is a material continuity of faith and belief, classically denominated the deposit of faith, that survives from age to age. This perpetuity, of course, is highly nuanced and qualified, but unmistakably contains an element of unchangeability.
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This is what is ultimately behind the theological use of "adequation," "correspondence," and "analogy." It is behind the concern for reconstructive hermeneutics. If revelation means, in one sense, that there is an identity of fundamental affirmations from generation to generation, then Heidegger's approach is unacceptable because it is simply unable to maintain this understanding. On the other hand, it is legitimate and essential to invert the question: Does the tradition provide an ontologically appropriate understanding of revelation? A particular understanding of revelation-with its veridical, hermeneutical, and linguistic corollaries-would need to be abandoned if it were unquestionably proven to be philosophically unsustainable. No view of revelation, however deeplv rooted in tradition, can finally stand if it is repugnant to reason. 82 This is the true meaning of the traditional axiom describing philosophy's relationship to theology: ancilla theologiae sed non ancilla nisi libera. This relationship between reason and revelation represents the concern I have with Lindbeck and postliberalism generally. Lindbeck wishes to defend, in a broad sense, and with cultural-linguistic differences, the material continuity of Christianity. He escapes, then, from the highly protean understanding of revelation at work in more explicitly Heideggerian-influenced thinkers. But he does this by positing divine agency alone, without any further ontological or hermeneutical warrants. From the viewpoint of Catholic theology, this position appears fideistic. tion honestly. If classical ontology is now inappropriate, leading to intractable aporias in the face of radical historicity, then one must seek an understanding of revelation that properly befits a newly presenced ontology. When Bonsor asks, for example, whether there is an epistemology inherent in revelation, his negative response is predicated on the conclusion that traditional epistemologa and the view of revelation it undergirds simply must be superseded.
3
There is certainly a highly defensible logic in this view. One cannot simply posit a theory of revelation and assert that this must be maintained at all costs and in the face of all evidence. As Kuhn, Hanson, and others have shown, this kind of theoretical myopia has been fully operative in the scientific tradition. Rather than adapt to evolving evidence and the accumulating weight of facts, scientists have frequently complicated older theories in order to avoid entirely new paradigms. Most infamously, this was the case with the addition of epicycles to the Ptolemaic model in order to avoid the conclusions of Copernicus. Is theology doing this as well? Are apodictic and ideology-driven minds protecting fanciful interstices of truth not saturated by enveloping change? Is the current admission of the influence upon doctrine of historical limitations, finite perspectives, sociocultural horizons, and ideological conditioning simply a "Ptolemaic" strategy to avoid conceding the triumph of historicity and consequently of postmodernity? Does theological resistance to postmodernity not bring to mind the observation of Lord Radnor to de Tocqueville that Catholicism's dogmas are unreasonable, but they are precise, offering a haven for tired minds?
84
Of course, it is true that if revelation is patient of nonfoundationalist ontologies, then our understanding of it must be reconceived as highly epiphanic and dialectical. Revelation must now be understood as highly changeable and protean, not simply in form (an advance already demanded by history) but even in fundamental content. 85 In this instance, revelation has the "givenness" characteristic of Being itself. Revelation is conceived along the Heideggerian notion of event, with its constant oscillation between presence and absence. Even if there are material contradictions from age to age, these should not be understood pejoratively but as newly revelatory of the elusive character of being and truth. What continues in the Church is not the same content held from age to age (even as developed and nuanced); what survives is Christian reflection on the same texts and symbols, ele- 85 It is precisely because of the alleged mutability of revelation that Gordon Kaufman says: "Theological work grounded principally on what is claimed to be authoritative 'revelation* is simply not appropriate today. The concept of revelation is itself a part of the conceptual scheme which has become questionable, and it is the overall scheme, therefore, which now must be carefully examined and possibly reconstructed" (In the Face of Mystery [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1993] 21). ments that have been handed down in the community and that continue to make claims on believers. Interpretations of the texts will (and must) vary even widely from age to age. A certain normativity belongs to the texts themselves, as witness to an originary event. But the understanding of them will always be reflective of varying and incommunicable forms of life; changes in interpretation and meaning will reflect the inexorable tides of historicity and mutability characteristic of all humanity, including the Christian community.
Catholic theology has adopted much from postmodernity and will continue to do so. Our theology has rightly become postrationalist, post-Enlightenment, and postpositivist. The march of Catholic thought in the 20th century has incorporated the principles of historical and ideological sensitivity. It has abandoned a naïve and wooden referentialism, dismissed the phantom of naked conceptualism, and accepted the difficulties attendant upon hermeneutical events. It has intensified the apophaticism inherent in understanding the divine. The best of this theology has perceived these changes not as grudging concessions, but as ontologically enriching and productive. At the same time, many questions remain vibrant: Can Catholic theology avoid the referentialism traditionally associated with its understanding of the mysteries of faith without betraying its identity? Can the metaphysics that undergirds the logic of realism, presence, and continuity, be thought of dyslogistically? Is there a surplus of intelligibility in divine truth that allows for material continuity without any claim of exhaustion? Can theology defend unity without lapsing into a simple-minded claim of absolute luminosity and presence?
The answers to these questions, I think, force a departure from postmodernity and its nonfoundationalism in favor of an historically and ideologically sophisticated foundationalism. This is a legitimate alternative to Heidegger's postmodernity, to the fideism of Lindbeck and Marion, and to the polycentrism of Tracy. It is not simply a restatement of ontotheology, but an attempt to understand the faith within the broad contours of both tradition and contemporary thought.
